The fundamental problem with Brexit is that there never was a coherent plan as to what would happen if the British electorate did the unthinkable and voted to leave the EU. Brexit means Brexit. The campaign during the referendum crossed party lines; whilst the official position of the major parties was that they backed continued EU membership, individual politicians were free to campaign with their consciences (or, in certain cases, the lack thereof). This meant that the government of the day was required to negotiate an exit that it had not planned for or wanted, making for tense relations in cabinet between Brexiteers and reluctant remainers moving for the exit.
There is no consensus amongst Brexiteers either. Hardliners want to see a hard Brexit which sees the UK sever all ties with the EU, freeing it to forge free-trade deals with any interested parties, abandon EU regulations and directives and see where it leads. Others want to be able to make the deals, but understand that a hard border in Ireland (and with other EU states) is highly undesirable and that the UK must remain “aligned” with EU regulations so that it can continue to trade with the EU as frictionlessly as possible. They want to see the status quo continue with the trade in services (notably financial services), but without the political and bureaucratic aspects of the EU interfering. These two distinct camps are mutually exclusive.
The issue of a or the customs union (see yesterday’s article) is fast becoming the defining battle of Brexit. Remainers support the idea of continuing arrangements with the EU via a or the customs union to ensure frictionless trade with the UK’s biggest trading partner and to protect the peace in Northern Ireland by ensuring that no hard border is reinstated with the Irish Republic (naturally, they see the best way to ensure this and all the advantages of EU membership is to “exit from Brexit” and remain in the EU). A backbench debate in parliament yesterday gave unanimous backing staying in the customs union. Whilst the debate has no constitutional consequences (and Conservative MPs were instructed not to vote and did not attend in great numbers), bills going through parliament have amendments tabled which, if passed, would require the government to do just that.
The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has reiterated that it would vote against any bill which would create a hard border in Ireland (a no deal scenario, for instance) or one that creates a de facto schism in the UK economy (by Northern Ireland remaining in a customs union whilst the rest of the UK leaves, for example). The DUP provides the government with a working majority. Hardline Brexiters are uncomfortable with the fall-back border resolution for Ireland which requires that the UK maintains regulatory alignment with the EU, obviating the need for customs checks on the border, potentially. They (understandably) claim that the whole purpose of Brexit is to enable regulatory divergence with the EU.
Two models for avoiding a hard border in Ireland (both unofficially rejected by the EU) would call for the UK to have a Customs Partnership with the EU (favoured by Mrs May) whereby the UK would collect import tariffs for the EU on applicable goods and a second “max-fac” proposal which relies on technological solutions (currently unavailable and deemed unworkable by experts speaking to a parliamentary select committee). Within cabinet, hard-liners are trying to persuade the PM to drop the idea of Customs Partnership for fear it could morph back into customs union at some stage.
Without an agreed settlement of the Irish border question, it is unlikely that the UK will be granted its transitional period which all but the most extreme of Brexiters recognise as essential to avoid the chaos of a “cliff edge” Brexit. To fail to make a decision on the customs union/border issue therefore plays into the hands of the so-called ultra-Brexiteers. Parliament has the sovereign right to pass and amend legislation as it sees fit, so the passage of the bills on trade and customs will be key to the whole Brexit, erm, project.
The government has no overall majority, so loss of DUP support; the support of hard Brexiteers, or a significant revolt by remain-minded Conservatives would mean that the government’s wishes could be overturned and a different course of action forced upon it.